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INTRODUCTION – OF ANARCHY, HIERARCHY AND SOURCES ORTHODOXY 
 
The discipline of international law, like all academic disciplines, is built around a set of accepted 
truths, intuitions and histories, which together form its distinctive episteme – as Foucault defines it – 
i.e. its paradigmatic structure of thought and argument. 1  One of these epistemic truths is that 
international law constitutes a distinctly anarchical order, not so much because it is chaotic and 
disorderly, but because it lacks a centralized and hierarchically structured law-making and law-
enforcing authority. 2  Domestic legal systems do, as a norm, benefit from highly developed and 
sophisticated institutional machineries endowed with the power of legislation and lawful coercion. 
International law, by contrast, is thought to be a largely horizontal system of governance in which 
juridical authority and the exercise of key legal functions (law-making, law determination and law 
enforcement) are fragmented and decentralized.3 
Horizontality – or the lack of hierarchy – is considered by most legal scholars a central fact of 
international life and the starting point for theorizing about international law. Nowhere is this more 
obvious, perhaps, than in the doctrine of sources. Conventional accounts of international law-making 
depict an eclectic and uncoordinated system in which States – as sovereign equals – create rules for 
themselves through various techniques and processes which can be engaged simultaneously or in 
competition with one another, no process being intrinsically superior, normatively, to the other.4 No 
constitution prevailing over ordinary statutes, no statutory law superior to common law, no decisions 
of higher courts binding on the decisions of lower courts: sources of international law are said to be of 
equal rank and status, so that a norm derived from one source is not as a matter of principle of a 
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1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1971). The concept of episteme 
was originally used by Foucault to define the set of rules that govern the production of knowledge across 
disciplines in a given culture and at a given time (for instance the classical episteme of Western culture). The 
concept has also been used, however, to describe a discipline’s own, indigenous knowledge structure or 
“regime of truth”. See, e.g., Dominique Chateau, Quelques Réflexions sur l’Éptistémè de l’Esthétique, 0 
PROTHEUS – CAHIERS DES THÉORIES DE L’ART 59 (2000). On international law as a discipline possessing its own 
distinctive episteme, see Mirjam Sophia Clados, Bioethics and International Law: An Analysis of the 
Intertwining of Bioethical and Legal Discourses (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universität München). 
2 This is anarchy as defined by Hedley Bull, i.e. a system of states that knows of no higher level of authority 
over states, and yet forms a society in which common rules and institutions provide elements of order. See 
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY – A STUDY IN WORLD POLITICS (2nd ed. 1977). 
3 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (2nd ed., 2005); MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (7th ed. 
2014); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (7th ed. 1997). 
4 See ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (2007) (describing the system of 
sources as “eclectic, unsystematic, overlapping, and often poorly coordinated”). 
higher value than a norm formed under another source. The concept of a formal, a priori hierarchy of 
sources is thus, on this view, alien to the structure of the international legal order.5 
The functional equivalence of sources should not, however, obscure the fact that international legal 
thought and practice are replete with varied forms of hierarchies which, though not necessarily openly 
acknowledged as such, nevertheless run deep in the system and inform the ways in which 
international law is conceptualized, made and applied. This paper examines two types of sources 
hierarchy. The first type concerns what may be termed “informal hierarchies of pre-eminence”. These 
informal hierarchies stem from the fact that, whilst acknowledging the functional or formal 
equivalence of sources, certain actors (states, adjudicators, scholars) tend to express preferences for 
particular sources because these sources are thought to possess some specific qualities or uphold 
certain values (determinacy, versatility, universality and so on) deemed desirable. These are soft and 
transient hierarchies which, as shall become clear, very much depend on contexts, circumstances, the 
identity of the legal subjects and the projects they pursue. But these are hierarchies nonetheless, 
inasmuch as they involve a differentiation of sources “in a normative light”, i.e. normative judgments 
in which some sources are deemed superior (good, effective, democratic) and others inferior (bad, 
inefficient, illegitimate).6 
The second type of source hierarchy is not concerned with the normative worth of individual sources 
but with the way in which they operate in practice (the pragmatics of sources). These hierarchies stem 
from the fact that international law-making processes structurally favor particular actors, voices and 
experiences (e.g. states, great powers, white men, transnational capital etc.) whilst marginalizing 
others (e.g. non-state groups, small powers, brown women, labor etc.). Despite a broad commitment 
to legislative equality, the international system accommodates, and indeed at times institutionalizes, 
inequalities in the making of international law. These material hierarchies, though not exclusive to 
international law, are pervasive in the international order and the fact that there are no formal, pre-
determined hierarchy among recognized sources of international law in no way indicates that the 
international system is a leveled playing field. The making of international law is characterized by 
powerful hierarchies of influence. These hierarchies are not hierarchies of or between recognized 
manifestations of international law but hierarchies in the sources of international law, and their day-
to-day operation. I shall refer to this second type of hierarchy as “material legislative hierarchies”. 
The following analysis is, by necessity, schematic and impressionistic. The informal and material 
hierarchies addressed here are by no means the only hierarchical structures found in the doctrine and 
practice of sources. Due to space constraints, the focus must remain on representative and 
characteristic examples, leaving other patterns to be analyzed elsewhere (for instance class and racial 
hierarchies).7 For the same reason, two sets of questions have also been excluded at the outset from 
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to international law, see B.S. Chimni, Prolegomena to a Class Approach to International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
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(2016, forthcoming). 
this paper. The first concerns the hierarchy of norms question, i.e. the relationship between individual 
norms or bodies of norms by reason of their content, irrespective of their source (for instance the 
superior status of jus cogens over dispositive law). This problem is conceptually distinct from the 
hierarchy of sources and has been debated at length in other works. 8  The second concerns the 
relationship between the so-called traditional sources of international law and new forms of law-
making “beyond the state” by public and private transnational governance bodies.9 
The main argument of this paper is that the “no-hierarchy” thesis – as a central leitmotiv of the theory 
of sources – is deceptive. It implies that law-making in the international order is an essentially 
horizontal process marked by source equivalence and legislative autonomy, when in reality the law of 
sources is riddled with various forms of status differentiation (i.e. hierarchies). For that reason, I argue 
in the conclusion for the refutation of the thesis as one that is both descriptively and normatively 
problematic. 
I. INFORMAL HIERARCHIES OF PRE-EMINENCE 
 
This section is concerned with – and seeks to offer important qualifications to – a central tenet of the 
“no-hierarchy” thesis, i.e. the view that sources of international law enjoy equal status as law-making 
procedures and exist in no predetermined order of importance or preponderance. Before it is qualified, 
this view requires brief explicitation. Though its limitations are well-known (the provision has been 
criticized as inadequate, incomplete and outdated), Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice remains the starting or rallying point for debates about international law-making and 
is widely believed to express “the universal perception as to the enumeration of sources of 
international law.”10 Sources are listed in Article 38 in a specific sequence (a to d) in what looks, 
superficially, like a rough hierarchy.11 During the drafting of Article 38, it was suggested that the 
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the hierarchy of norms concerns the differentiation between norms or bodies of norms by reason of their 
content/substance, not their legal form. On the difference between the two types of hierarchies and how they 
can be mobilized to resolve normative conflicts in international law, see JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). On the hierarchy of 
norms question, see generally Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 
(2006); Juan Antonio Carillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law, 
8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 583 (1997); HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PLACE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Erika De Wet & Jure 
Vidmar eds., 2012).  
9 For a general overview of the problems posed by the rising (and largely uncontrolled) regulatory power of 
global governance bodies, see EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014). On the heterarchical 
interaction of the national, international and transnational legal orders, see NICO KRISCH, BEYOND PLURALISM – THE 
PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
10 See SHAW, supra note 3, at 50. Scholars do debate, of course, whether Article 38 represents an authoritative 
and definitive statement of sources (i.e. the meta-norm of sources), or merely a clause of applicable law for 
the ICJ. Few dispute its pragmatic value as a rallying point for the doctrine of sources, however. See, on this 
point, JÖRG KAMMERHOFER, UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A KELSENIAN PERSPECTIVE 208-10 (2011). 
11 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993: 
“The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the consenting states; 
b. International custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law; 
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
sources listed in the provision should be considered in that specific order, with treaties prevailing over 
custom and custom prevailing over general principles.12 The proposal was rejected, however, and as a 
result the order in which the sources are enumerated in Article 38 is generally thought to be of no 
legal relevance, though most scholars highlight the summa divisio which the provision establishes 
between primary and subsidiary sources of international law, the former (treaties and custom) 
standing as the only true sources of law whilst the latter (judicial decisions and doctrinal writings) are 
said to serve only the interpretation and ascertainment of existing norms, lacking the ability to create 
rights and obligations ex nihilo.13 
Beyond this broad categorization, however, the consensus remains that Article 38 does not establish a 
rigid hierarchy of sources, particularly when it comes to the relationship between customary law and 
treaties. These are said to exist alongside each other in no particular order of pre-eminence, in a kind 
of decentralized and pluralistic arrangement where no source ranks higher than the other.14 The fact 
that a norm was created via one or the other sources listed in article 38 – i.e. its formal pedigree – is 
thought to be of little or no relevance to its legal status and authority. At a practical level, the absence 
of inherent hierarchies among sources of international law means that adjudicators are left to resolve 
conflicts of norms on an ad hoc basis, by means of interpretative techniques (e.g. harmonious 
interpretation) or conflict resolution principles (jus cogens, lex specialis, lex posterior). 15 
Unsurprisingly, these ad hoc resolutions nearly always lead to a prioritization of the tribunal’s own 
body of law, in what may be termed a preference for the law of the forum or, more accurately 
perhaps, hegemonic assertions of jurisdiction. In these hegemonic struggles, conflicts of norms are 
thus rarely resolved in accordance with pre-established hierarchies and are instead largely determined 
by the identity of the adjudicator (who decides) and the project it was set up to defend (trade, human 
rights, security and so on).16 
The absence of rigid and formal hierarchies in the doctrine of sources should not, however, serve to 
conceal the fact that states, adjudicators and legal scholars have, historically, expressed clear 
preferences for particular sources, and have thus established informal hierarchies, if not of validity, at 
the very least of importance or pre-eminence among law-making processes. The theory and practice 
of sources, in other words, is not entirely alien to what Parry once called “logical scales of values”, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary mean for the determination of rules of 
law” 
12 On the drafting history of Article 38, see Akehurst, supra note 5, at 274-5. 
13 JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (2013) (“judicial decisions and the writings of the most highly qualified 
publicists are listed as subsidiary means only .… It follows from the organizing principle of sovereignty that 
[these subsidiary means] cannot make law, but only apply it”); HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
8 (2014) (“Neither a judge nor a scholar says ‘This is the law, because I say so’; they both lay down what they 
regard as established by one of the other sources”). 
14 On the absence of hierarchy among treaty and customary law, see Military and Paramilitary Activities In and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v United States), 1986 ICJ REP. 14, para. 176 (“it cannot therefore be held that Article 
51 [of the United Nations Charter] is a provision which ‘subsumes and supervenes’ customary international 
law…. [I]n the field in question …. Customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law”). 
15 See generally Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law – Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission (finalized by Martti 
Koskenniemi), UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation Report]; PAUWELYN, supra note 8, at 89-
109; and Maarten Bos, The Hierarchy Among the Recognized Manifestations (“Sources”) of International Law, 
25 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 334 (1978). 
16 For a theory of fragmentation as struggle for institutional hegemony and normative authoritativeness, see 
Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1 
(2007); International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 197 (2004). 
i.e. the logical ordering of sources according to specific value judgments about their respective 
merits. 17  Two such hierarchies are analyzed here, positing the superiority/primacy (if not the 
supremacy) of treaty law and customary law respectively. Other orderings are possible, however, and 
as noted by David Kennedy, “advocates of all logically available positions exist” regarding the 
hierarchical relationship among the various Article 38 sources.18 
 
A. The Treaty Primacy Thesis 
 
Legal reason is, fundamentally, a hierarchical form of reason “establishing relationships of inferiority 
and superiority between units and levels of legal discourse.”19 For this reason, and even though legal 
scholars are at one is arguing that there is no formal hierarchy among the sources of international law, 
they generally find it difficult to refrain from passing some form of judgment on the superiority of one 
or the other sources listed in Article 38 (and by implication on the inferiority of the others). The 
leading view in this regard, at least as far as modern international law is concerned, is that treaties are 
the “most prominent”, “most important”, “most fundamental”, “dominant”, “major”, “principal” or 
“primary” source of international law.20 To some scholars, the pre-eminence of treaties is such that 
international law-making can be usefully divided into “treaty law” and “non-treaty law.”21 Treaties on 
the one hand; everything else on the other. In fact, it is not rare for legal scholars to regard treaties and 
international law as one and the same. 
The “treaty primacy” thesis comes in various degrees and forms, which can be categorized in two 
principal streams of arguments. The first stream posits that treaties and custom are normatively 
equivalent but that, as a matter of procedural order, treaties take priority over other sources of 
international law. When deciding a case, the argument goes, courts and tribunals do routinely – and 
should as a matter of principle – look at treaties first, before considering non-treaty sources.22 This 
view is based on two principal justifications. The first is a pragmatic consideration. Treaties are 
generally thought to be superior instruments for resolving disputes owing to their written character, 
which confers a greater degree of precision and textual determinacy to treaty norms. Treaty norms are 
easier to locate, ascertain and apply than other norms, particularly customary norms, the precise 
content of which can be difficult and onerous to establish. As noted by Beckett, “state practice is 
                                                          
17 CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (1965). 
18 David Kennedy, The Sources of International Law, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 16(1987). 
19 Koskenniemi, supra note 6, at 566. 
20 See, e.g., KLABBERS, supra note 13, at 25 (“the treaty has become the dominant source of international law”); 
CRAWFORD, supra note 5, at 30 (“treaties are the most important source of obligation in international law”); 
DUNCAN B. HOLLIS, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 8 (2012) (“treaties are an essential vehicle for organizing 
international cooperation and coordination. In both quantitative and qualitative terms, they are the primary 
source for international legal commitments and, indeed, international law generally”); CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC – TOME 1: INTRODUCTION ET SOURCES 59 (1970) (“si l’article 38 n’établit pas de hiérarchie entre 
les différentes sources qu’il énumère …. on constate qu’il y a accord sur les idées suivantes : la première 
source, incontestablement la plus importante, est formée par les traités”); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123-4 (1974) (“it is obvious that, in the fast moving articulate and complex 
international society of today, the international treaty increasingly replaces custom as the principal source of 
international law”). 
21 See, e.g., PATRICK DAILLER, MATHIAS FORTEAU AND ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (8thed., 2009) who 
subcategorize their chapter on international law-making into “formation conventionnelle” and “formation non 
conventionnelle”. 
22 See Fragmentation Report, supra note 15, para. 85: 'this informal hierarchy …. emerges as a 'forensic' or a 
'natural' aspect of legal reasoning. Any court or lawyer will first look at treaties, then custom and then the 
general principles of law for an answer to a normative problem'. 
widely dispersed, often awkward to identify, hard to weigh, and generally not uniform …. It is easier 
to consult a written source.” 23  Treaty law is also, by and large, devoid of the ontological and 
methodological uncertainties that are characteristic of customary law. Proving a treaty norm is 
generally unproblematic. There is hardly ever any dispute about the existence of a treaty: A treaty is 
either in force between the parties, or it isn’t.24 Proving custom, by contrast, is a far more uncertain 
enterprise that nearly always gives rise to serious controversies and often leave adjudicators (or 
codifiers) exposed to criticism.25 In these circumstances, it is not surprising that courts and tribunals 
should, as a matter of practice, demonstrate a preference for the formality and definition of treaty law. 
Noting this point, Charlesworth writes of a “hierarchy of sources in terms of ease of identification.”26 
That treaties should enjoy procedural or operational priority is also justified by a principled 
consideration. This stems from the notion that states, by concluding treaties, are purposely ‘opting 
out’ of general (often understood as customary) international law to establish a special, derogatory 
regime (i.e. a lex specialis) in a given area of cooperation. This argument is found in its purest 
expression in the writings of Hersch Lauterpacht. Using a domestic law analogy, Lauterpacht 
considers that the rights and duties of states: 
“are determined, in the first instance, by their agreement as expressed in treaties, just as in the 
case of individuals their rights are specifically determined by an y contract which is binding 
upon them. When a controversy arises between two or more States with regard to a matter 
regulated by a treaty, it is natural that the parties should invoke and that the adjudicating agency 
should apply, in the first instance, the provisions of the treaty in question …. In the above 
sense, treaties must be considered as ranking first in the hierarchical order of the sources of 
international law.”27 
The notion that treaties should take precedence as lex specialis inter partes has been recognized on 
various occasions in positive law. The 1907 Hague Convention (XII) relative to the Creation of an 
International Prize Court, for instance, explicitly provided that “if the question of law to be decided is 
covered by a treat in force between [the parties], the Court is governed by the provisions in the said 
treaty. In the absence of such provisions, the Court shall apply the rules of international law.”28 
Though this procedural sequencing was not repeated in Article 38, the ICJ has itself stated on several 
occasions that “rules of [general] international law can, by agreement, be derogated from in particular 
cases or as between particular parties”29 and that “in general, treaty rules being lex specialis, it would 
not be appropriate that a State should bring a claim based on customary-law rule if it has by treaty 
                                                          
23 Jason Beckett, Customary International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 134 (Başak Çali 
ed., 2010). 
24 Disputes occasionally arise regarding the validity of a treaty or its termination, though this is a rather rare 
occurrence. See, for a characteristic example, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia), 1997 ICJ REP. 
7. 
25 The ICJ was notoriously criticized for its method of ascertaining customary law in the Nicaragua case, with 
some legal scholars blaming the Court for its “revisionist” approach, for blurring the lines between practice 
and opinio juris and for “trashing” customary international law. Similar criticisms were levelled against the 
ICRC when it published its 2009 restatement of customary international humanitarian law. See, on this point, 
my analysis in MARIO PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-2 (2012).  
26 Hilary Charlesworth, Law-making and sources, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (James 
Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012). 
27 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW – COLLECTED PAPERS VOL. 1 87-8 (1970). 
28 Convention [No. XII] Relative to the Creation of an International Prize Court, art. 7, Oct. 18, 1907, 100 BRIT. & 
FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 435 (1906-7).. 
29 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark/Netherlands), 1969 ICJ REP. 42, 
para. 72. 
already provided means for settlement of such a claim.”30 The International Law Commission, in its 
study on the fragmentation of international law, noted this jurisprudence, holding that “international 
tribunals give precedence to treaty law in matters where there is customary law as well – a practice 
that highlights the dispositive nature of custom and the tribunals’ deference to agreements as the 
‘hardest’ and presumably most legitimate basis on which their decisions can be based.”31 
The procedural priority of treaty law constitutes the first version of the “treaty primacy” thesis. The 
second version of the thesis is rather different. It posits that treaty law is not just operationally, but 
normatively superior to (i.e. better than) other law-making processes. The argument here is that the 
treaty is, comparatively, a “first-class” source of international law that possesses unique qualities and 
attributes. Though legal scholars have expressed a wide range of views in this regard, treaty law is 
generally thought to possess three essential qualities that set it apart from other sources: ontological 
determinacy, practical versatility, and process legitimacy. Ontological determinacy refers to the fact, 
already alluded to, that the nature of treaties as a source of international law is “unambiguous and 
uncontroversial.”32 Compared to customary law - whose nature, constitutive elements and methods of 
ascertainment remain matters of intense debate – the law of treaties appears remarkably reliable and 
well-settled, to the point that it has become practically unthinkable today to challenge its content.33 
Though some areas of the law of treaties are open-ended or subject to continued discussion (e.g. treaty 
interpretation, reservations), the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the argument goes, offers 
“consummate clarity”34 to treaty law as a source of rights and obligations and effectively functions as 
a form of “meta law”, a “stable legal code” that regulates the whole life-cycle of treaties, from their 
making, identification and validation, to their application, interpretation, modification and 
termination.35 Treaties thus enjoy a degree of “source determinacy” unknown to other law-making 
processes, promoting legal certainty and security in international relations.36 
As well as enjoying determinacy, treaties are generally favored for their practical versatility. Treaties 
can be used for a variety of purposes and in a variety of contexts, from the dramatic (war) to the 
mundane (duty free shopping).37 They can be used to codify or restate pre-existing customary law, or 
to make a fresh start and create new rules almost instantly.38 They can be used to regulate bilateral 
relations, or for larger legislative ambitions, laying down whole regimes to govern holistically areas 
such as humanitarian law or climate change. They can serve to articulate general principles of law 
                                                          
30 Nicaragua, supra note 14, para. 274. See also Amoco International Finance Corporation v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 27 I.L.M. 1314 (1988), para. 112 (“as a lex specialis in the relations between the two countries, the Treaty 
supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary international law”). 
31 Supra note 22, para. 81. 
32 G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1983). 
33 On the methodological problems posed by the identification of customary law, see OLIVIER CORTEN, 
MÉTHODOLOGIE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 149-78 (2009). 
34 THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 59-60 (1990). 
35 MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (7thed., 2013). 
36 For a discussion of “source determinacy” as a signifier of progress in international law, see Thomas 
Skouteris, The Force of a Doctrine: Art. 38 of the PCJI Statute and the Sources of International Law, in EVENTS: 
THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja eds., 2011). The notion that the 
primary function of the law of treaties should be to provide certainty and security in legal relations was central 
to proceedings at the 1969 Vienna Conference. See United Nations Conference on The Law of Treaties, First 
session, Vienna, 26 March-24 May 1969, A/CONF.39/11. 
37 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TREATIES X (Christian Tams, Antonios Tzanakopoulos and Andreas 
Zimmermann eds., 2014). 
38 On the treaty as an instrument of legal innovation/renovation in a fast-moving world, see CHARLES DE 
VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (1968); FRIEDMANN, supra note 20, at 123-4. 
(sovereign equality, non intervention, self-determination), but equally to adopt highly specific 
technical standards on commodity prices or water pollution. A number of things, to finish, can only be 
done by way of treaties, most notably the setting up of international institutions like the UN or the 
EU.39 
Lastly, and critically, the treaty is generally viewed as superior to other sources by reason of its 
perceived legitimacy as a law-making process. Treaty making, to begin, is premised on the principle 
of freedom of contract (though the exercise of this freedom is rarely unconstrained, see below). States 
are free to sign up to a treaty or to choose not to become a party.40 They enjoy full freedom as regards 
the modalities and form of agreement. They are free to enter reservations, limiting or modifying the 
effect of the treaty in its application to them. And States are free, of course, to withdraw from treaties 
(in accordance with their provisions), as was recently illustrated by the withdrawal of Latin American 
States from the ICSID Convention.41 Treaty making is thus, in principle, a conscious, deliberative 
process respectful of State consent and contractual autonomy. It is also, to an extent, subjected to 
democratic scrutiny. Treaty negotiations, in important areas such as climate change or 
trade/investment, are largely covered by the media and the subject of public debate. Civil society is 
increasingly involved in treaty making, with the participation of NGOs in intergovernmental 
conferences and proceedings.42 And in many instances, treaty ratification involves a domestic “chain 
of legitimacy” where treaties must be approved by the Parliament or some representative institution, 
and sometimes even by popular referendum.43 Treaty making, for the above reasons, is often regarded 
as comparatively more transparent and democratic than other law-making processes (especially the 
nebulous process of customary law formation), a fact that is said to increase the effectiveness of 
international law, as norms generated through legitimate processes are thought to exert greater 
“compliance pull” and thus harder to disobey.44 
 
B. The Custom Primacy Thesis 
 
The “treaty primacy” thesis has become dominant in the contemporary doctrine of sources. Very few 
would deny that treaties have come to assume a central role in international law-making, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. That thesis has, however, always coexisted with others that posit that 
custom ranks higher, normatively, than treaty law. As with the “treaty primacy” thesis, there exist 
several versions of the “custom primacy” thesis, three of which are discussed here. 
The first version of the thesis posits that custom is superior to other sources – in particular treaty law – 
inasmuch as it precedes and pre-determines them, in other words that there can be no treaty law 
without a pre-existing framework of customary law governing its formation. This argument has a long 
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history. Writing at the turn of the 20th century, Oppenheim notoriously stated that custom “is the 
original source of international law.”45 What he meant was not so much that, chronologically, custom 
came first and treaties second, but rather that custom was not dependent on any other source to exist, 
whereas treaties could only exist against the background of custom: “treaties are a source the power of 
which derives from custom. For the fact that treaties can stipulate rules of international conduct at all 
is based on the customary rule of the Law of Nations that treaties are binding upon the contracting 
parties.”46 
The limits of this theory are well known. As Lauterpacht famously noted, if one subscribes to the 
view that treaties are binding only because there is a customary rule to that effect, “there remains the 
question why custom is binding.” 47 It has, however, proved remarkably resilient. Kelsen, in his 
General Theory of Law and State, observed that “if we ask why a treaty is valid, we are led to the 
general norm which obligates the States to behave in conformity with the treaties they have 
concluded, a norm commonly expressed by the phrase pacta sunt servanda. This is a norm of general 
international law, and general international law is created by custom …. Customary international law 
…. is the first stage within the international legal order.”48 Reuter, a leading scholar of the law of 
treaties and a firm believer in the “central position” of treaty law in international life, conceded that 
“treaties are binding by virtue not of a treaty but of customary rules. In that sense, international 
custom is even more central than the law of treaties since it is the very pillar on which treaties rest. If 
one were to speak of a ‘constitution’ of the international community, it would have to be a customary 
one.”49 Crawford, in his recent Hague Lectures, took the same view, arguing that “international law is 
a customary law system, despite all the treaties: even the principle pacta sunt servanda, the obligation 
to comply with treaties, is a customary law obligation.”50 Common to all these views about the 
primacy of custom is the notion that customary law has a privileged, elemental status “at the heart” of 
the international legal order and represents the source of all sources, the background that determines 
the condition of validity of all other legal norms and processes.51 
This first version of the “custom primacy” thesis, it should be noted, is not so much concerned with 
custom as a law-making process as it is with certain basic, foundational principles (e.g. pacta sunt 
servanda) that happen to be of a customary nature.52 The second and third versions of the thesis, by 
contrast, have more to do with custom as a process and its comparative merits. The second version of 
the thesis, to begin with, posits that custom is the only process capable of producing law in the proper 
sense of the term, i.e. rules of general validity, applicable to the legal order as a whole and to all legal 
subjects. This view was notoriously put forward by Fitzmaurice, who argued that treaties ought to be 
viewed as mere contracts which can do little more than create specific rules, applicable to specific 
parties, in specific contexts. Unable to produce genuine rules of law, treaties, he concluded, cannot be 
considered as sources of international law but merely as sources of rights and obligations. They may 
lead to the emergence of law proper if their provisions pass into the general corpus of customary 
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international law. Owing to their contractual nature, however, Fitzmaurice viewed treaties as “no 
more a source of law than an ordinary private law contract.”53 
This view of treaties as a mere source of obligations has had a certain influence and was espoused by 
many scholars after Fitzmaurice. Parry, for instance, while recognizing that treaties are of paramount 
importance when determining the rights and duties of States inter se, argued that the contribution of 
treaties to “the whole content and stuff of the international legal system …. is relatively small.”54 To 
Parry, the treaty is essentially peripheral as a source of international law. It is custom, in his view, that 
defines the basic constitutional structure and general principles of international law as a system. The 
treaty, for its part, is simply “the contract of the international legal system” and in the same way that 
one can learn about English law without reading a single contract, or even a single statute, “one can 
have a very fair idea of international law without having read a single treaty and one cannot gain any 
coherent idea of the essence of international law by reading treaties alone.”55 Brownlie, to provide 
another example, listed treaties alongside General Assembly resolutions and drafts adopted by the 
International Law Commission as “material sources” exercising direct influence on the content of the 
law, rather than “formal sources” of law proper – a distinction that endured until Crawford’s re-
edition of Brownlie’s classical textbook. 56  The point in these arguments about sources is that a 
hierarchy of sorts is introduced between custom as legislation and treaties as contracts. 
The third version of the “custom primacy” thesis, to finish, is more directly concerned with the 
specific attributes which custom is said to possess as a law-making process. To some legal scholars, 
customary law, as a formal source, is normatively superior (better) to other sources in its ability to 
generate universally applicable norms, i.e. norms which are binding on any and all States at once. 
Whilst treaties may theoretically achieve universal participation, the argument goes, this remains an 
extremely rare occurrence and the universality of treaties is, in any event, likely to be undermined by 
reservations and other flexibility mechanisms.57 Norms generated through the customary process, by 
contrast, do not necessitate all states to opt in to become universal. Customary norms are born 
universal and states are not permitted to opt out of customary law unless they have persistently and 
unambiguously objected to its formation, a possibility that has played such a limited role in practice 
that it has become essentially theoretical.58 As was stated unambiguously by the ICJ, “customary rules 
and obligations, by their very nature, must have equal force for all members of the international 
community and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of unilateral exclusion.”59  
Customary law, in this sense, offers the promise of majority rule and universal legality. Majoritarian 
universality is thus the great strength, the “unique selling point” of customary international law.60 
Whether this prospect is attractive and legitimate is, of course, very much a matter of perspective and 
circumstances. Creating legal norms without the consent of all concerned states would certainly 
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appear illegitimate to most 19th century legal positivists, and the classical position of the International 
Court of Justice has consistently been that international rules only exist if and where they have been 
developed with the consent of those concerned.61 The notion of non-consensual law-making always 
did, however, appeal to scholars committed to the idea of universal law and frustrated with the strict 
contractual nature of treaties and the limits inherent in voluntary law-making.62 In recent years, this 
frustration has known something of a renewal, most notably in debates concerning global public 
goods. Many scholars have highlighted what they see as the inherent inadequacy of treaty law and its 
emphasis on state consent in dealing with global public good challenges such as climate change 
mitigation, fisheries depletion, the management of pandemics, or global security threats.63 To resolve 
such problems, the argument goes, global rules must be developed which are binding on all states. 
Because we cannot expect rules, especially in such controversial areas, to receive the specific 
individual consent of each and every one of the nearly two hundred states composing the international 
community today, these rules must be developed "regardless of the attitude of any particular state"64, 
i.e. without or perhaps even against the will of individuals states.65 Treaty making, in this context, 
becomes problematic in that it gives any state the right to object to the formation of any proposed rule 
of international law. An excessive commitment to consent is thus perceived as crippling efforts to 
develop the international norms which the world so desperately needs.66 
The limits of treaty making in addressing global public good problems has prompted a (re)turn to non-
consensual law-making processes. Some scholars have argued for the use of international institutions 
with majoritarian voting rules.67 Others, however, have simply advocated a wider use of custom as a 
way to achieve universal norms without the specific support of every member of the global 
community. Justice Weeramantry, for instance, has claimed that custom is vastly superior to the treaty 
as an instrument for dealing with global public good challenges. Pointing to the near impossibility of 
obtaining universal treaty ratification, he argues that "we need to have resort to a set of principles that 
do not owe their existence to an act of specific state consent but reach beyond state consent to the 
primordial verities and principles on which the international order is founded." 68  In his view, 
"customary international law provides such a source which will need to be increasingly relied upon in 
a future where unexpected and urgent problems of an unprecedented nature will keep arising, for 
which treaty law cannot provide the solution."69 
The superiority of custom as a source capable of producing legal universals is of course rooted in a 
particular vision of the world and of the role of law in it. The universal as a project is always 
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particularly located. The primacy of custom is here justified on utilitarian (solving global public good 
problems) and semi-naturalist grounds (the "primordial verities and principles" of the international 
order). And output legitimacy (generating norms despite opposition by a reluctant minority) matters 
more than normative legitimacy (the "justness" of norms and institutional arrangements) or process 
legitimacy (who decides and according to what procedures). Unsurprisingly, these justifications for 
the primacy of custom do not resonate with everyone and some states and scholars have historically 
resisted custom as a legitimate method for making (universally applicable) international laws. In the 
immediate post-colonial era, in particular, the approach of Third World States and scholars to 
international law was characterized by a clear rejection of custom. Importantly, this was not simply a 
rejection of specific customary norms, thought to express relationships of domination, inequality or 
privilege. The rejection was much deeper and concerned custom as a law-making process more 
generally. Custom as a process was deemed both illegitimate and ineffective. It was deemed anti-
democratic, for it was created in accordance with the needs of powerful (Western) nations and then 
imposed onto the silent (non-Western) majority.70 And it was deemed ineffective because it made the 
prospect of radical transformation of the legal system remote. Newly independent states were in need 
of institutions and structures allowing rapid modification and adaptation of the law, a need to which 
custom, with its slow and undecided tempo, was ill-adapted. Custom was thus perceived as a largely 
deficient source of international law: "backward looking, conservative because static, iniquitous in its 
content, ponderous in its formation, custom as traditionally conceived cannot be of real use in the 
development of new rules, and could actually be an obstacle to any attempt at change."71 Most Afro-
Asian states, as a result, expressed a clear preference for reforming the law through deliberative 
mechanisms such as conferences, treaties and resolutions.72 
 
C. Conclusion on informal hierarchies 
 
Doctrines about the sources of international law generally begin with an abstract definition of the 
sources listed in Article 38 and nearly always posit, as a general rule, that there exists no formal 
hierarchy among them. Beyond this, however, and as the above makes clear, the discourse on sources 
is replete with hierarchical discussions elaborating the procedural, practical or normative superiority 
of some sources over others. International law about sources, in this sense, is first and foremost a set 
of doctrinal boundaries and hierarchies. Critically, though, these hierarchies are not rigid, pre-
determined or definitive but rather fluid and transient. The hierarchical arguments discussed above are 
not always, to begin with, mutually exclusive. It may be possible for instance to argue that treaties 
take precedence over custom as a matter of procedural or operational priority, and at the same time 
that treaty law remains somehow subordinate to customary law, as the latter determines its conditions 
of validity and interpretation. Lauterpacht is a case in point here, having argued on different occasions 
that, operationally, treaty law "ranks first in the hierarchical order of the sources of international 
law"73 and, at the same time, that "in the international sphere, where legislation in the true sense of the 
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world is non-existent, custom is still the primary source: it supplies the framework, the background 
and the principal instrument of the interpretation of treaties."74 
More importantly though, these arguments about sources hierarchies are rarely, if ever, fixed or set in 
stone. They are more often than not context-dependent and determined by the project or strategy 
pursued by the lawyers making them. These informal hierarchies reflect and continue the 
problematics and desires that motivate them. Arguments about the primacy of treaty law are generally 
driven by a desire for determinacy and consent-based legitimacy. Arguments about the primacy of 
custom are generally driven by a desire for autonomy (from consent) and universality. As contexts 
and desires shift, so too do sources hierarchies. In the classical doctrine of international law, the main 
hierarchy was not between treaties and custom but one between natural (divine) law and man-made 
rules. To a 19th century scholar, normative hierarchies had to reflect a positivist concern with state 
consent, thus giving priority to treaties as the ideal type of sources. To a 20th century Third World 
scholar, the hierarchy of sources is one typically characterized by a rejection of traditional sources and 
a preference for mechanisms giving force to the numerical strength of the non-Western world (e.g. 
GA resolutions). Source hierarchies are thus historically contingent. 75 They are also functionally 
determined. Each source possesses specific design features (determinacy, flexibility, universality and 
so on) that make it suitable to deal with particular classes of cooperation problems. States may prefer 
the design features of treaties when tackling problems with high distributional costs (e.g. climate 
change) but express preference for custom in dealing with problems that require norms articulated at a 
high level of generality or in domains where rules benefit all states in equal proportion (e.g. state 
immunities).76 Likewise, the same lawyer might argue the superiority of the treaty in one context (as a 
legal scholar for instance) and, the next day, argue the primacy of customary law in another context 
(as a legal adviser, counsel or judge). And even within one and the same context, arguments about 
source hierarchies typically fluctuate between the "treaty primacy" and "custom primacy" theses, 
mediating the tension between determinacy and generality, consensualism and non-consensualism, 
sovereignty and community.77 
II. MATERIAL HIERARCHIES AND THE PRAGMATICS OF SOURCES 
 
The previous section was concerned with the first facet of the "no-hierarchy" thesis, i.e. the notion 
that there exists no a-priori hierarchy of validity or importance among formal sources of international 
law. I now turn to the second, perhaps more problematic aspect of the no-hierarchy thesis, namely the 
view that law-making processes, in the way that they operate, are in essence non-hierarchical. This 
section offers a short introduction to the founding principle of legislative equality in international law 
before examining some of the hierarchies of status, worth and influence that characterize law-making 
in the international system. As noted above, these hierarchies do not concern the relationship between 
various sources in the formal sense of the term. These are material hierarchies that manifest 
themselves in the concrete workings of sources as law-making processes, i.e. in their pragmatics. 
These are hierarchies of sources nonetheless and, as explained below, to the extent that these 
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hierarchies are accommodated and sanctioned by the international legal system, they cannot simply be 
discarded as belonging to the domain of politics, i.e. as something that does not concern international 
law strictly speaking. These material hierarchies are integral to the fabric and structure of international 
law, a fact that is rarely acknowledged in the context of debates on (the hierarchy of) sources. 
 
A. The principle of legislative equality 
 
It is a commonplace to say that international law, as a system, is premised on the sovereign equality of 
states. Since at least the middle of the 18th century, publicists of all schools and dispositions - 
naturalists and positivists alike - have highlighted the equality of states as one of the primary 
postulates of the law of nations.78 As famously noted by Chief Justice Marshall in the Antelope Case: 
"no principle of general law is more universally acknowledged than the perfect equality of nations."79 
At times criticized but never abandoned, the principle has, through the centuries, "clung with tenacity 
to the trunk of legal science."80 Reaffirmed in major textbooks and in leading international documents 
- from the Montevideo Convention to the UN Charter or the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations 
among States81 - sovereign equality, to this day, continues to be regarded as a canonical principle and 
is routinely reiterated by courts and tribunals as one of the basic constitutional doctrines of 
international law.82 While the orthodoxy of sovereign equality readily acknowledges the pervasive 
inequalities and power differentials among states in the "real world" of international relations ("of 
course some states are more equal than others")83, these are usually relegated to the realm of the 
political - outside the law - in a way that only serves to reinforce the alleged autonomy of the legal 
domain and  international law's egalitarian promise. 
The principle of sovereign equality - perhaps because of its canonical status - is rarely examined in 
much depth and has no fixed or stable meaning. At minimum, however, it is generally thought to 
possess formal, existential and substantive implications. Formally, states are said to be "equal before 
the law", i.e. to have equal capacity to vindicate and exercise their rights, most notably in courts and 
tribunals where their claims are treated as having equal value and dignity.84 Existentially, all states are 
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said to possess self-definitional agency, i.e. the freedom to choose their political, social, economic and 
cultural system.85 Substantively, to finish, all states - big or small - are said to possess a bundle of 
fundamental rights and privileges, including the right to territorial integrity, the right to freely dispose 
of their natural resources, sovereign immunities, the right to self-help, and the right to make treaties, 
join international organizations like the UN and litigate in international courts such as the 
International Court of Justice.86 
In addition to the above, sovereign equality is also understood to have important implications for 
international law-making (i.e. for sources). This is what McNair calls "equality for law-making 
purposes" or what Simpson, more recently, has dubbed "legislative equality". 87  The notion of 
legislative equality boils down to two broad principles. At a fundamental level, states are equal in that 
they are presumed to be obligated only to the extent of their actual or constructive consent, i.e. they 
cannot be subjected to obligations to which they have not consented. This is the famous Lotus 
principle according to which "the rules of law abiding upon States .... emanate from their own free 
will [and are] established .... between co-existing independent communities."88 At a more practical or 
procedural level, sovereign equality requires states to be given an equal say in the creation of 
international norms. Traditionally, this has been taken to mean that states are entitled, in international 
proceedings, to equality of representation and equality of vote, and to an equal role in the formation of 
customary and treaty law. 89  States are said to have the same "capacity for rights" and equal 
competence to make and enforce laws. International law-making, on this view, is thus predicated on a 
(liberal) vision of states as independent, autonomous agents that engage in international juridical 
transactions on an equal footing and produce norms through conscious, regular and deliberate 
processes.90 
Legislative equality has never existed in a pure, unadulterated form in international law. It has always 
been the site of intense negotiations and, to an extent, the history of international law can be read has 
a history of struggles for sovereign equality, with great powers attempting to weaken or deflect the 
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principle and smaller states investing it in the hope that it may one day deliver substantive benefits.91 
What is certain is that accounts of international law-making that remain exclusively predicated upon 
the presumption of legislative equality are at best deceptive and at worse dangerous, politically and 
epistemologically. Despite a broad commitment to sovereign equality, the international legal system is 
indeed profoundly structured by a variety of hierarchies that affect not simply the substance of legal 
norms but the very processes of law-making. These hierarchies, at times, simply operate as factual 
hierarchies of influence. As the rest of this section will demonstrate, however, they are more often 
than not sanctioned or institutionalized by the legal system itself. When this happens, they become 
legalized hierarchies that shape the making of international law from within, and not simply from 
without, as a mere matter of international political economy. 
 
B. Hierarchies of Influence: Great Powers, Great (White) Men, and the Making of International Law 
 
Law is the outcome of power struggles. It is both an expansion of and a constraint on power 
structures, a legitimizer and a civilizer. In any legal system, powerful agents are subject to the law but 
are able to mobilize their resources (material, cultural, economic and otherwise) to influence the 
legislative process and produce favorable outcomes. This is a basic fact of juridical life to which 
international law is evidently not immune. In the international system, as in all legal systems in the 
world, dominant actors - in particular great powers - influence the law-making process and its 
distributive consequences.92 
The influence of great powers is felt at different levels of the international legislative process. In 
treaty-making, great powers have historically enjoyed quasi-hegemonic privileges. For three centuries 
following the Treaties of Westphalia, as European nations expanded their influence across the globe, 
they organized and formalized their relationship with polities on the periphery through treaties.93 
Those treaties - used to acquire territories, secure trade benefits, and protect the property rights of 
European citizens - were not negotiated by nations treating each other as equals but were more often 
than not imposed on non-European states under duress, with flawless legal validity.94 Within Europe, 
treaty-making was deeply shaped by power differentials too, despite Westphalia's egalitarian promise. 
Nowhere was this more obvious than in the 19th century Concert system. The Congress of Vienna in 
1815 heralded an era of great power management in Europe in which the four (then five) great powers 
of the day made decisions for the rest of Europe with little or no participation by other states. In the 
Concert system, the great powers decided the fate of small countries, rearranged the map of Europe 
and laid down rules of international law on the status of international rivers, the status of diplomatic 
representatives or the suppression of the slave trade. The great five acted as self-appointed law-
makers and other states accepted the rules laid down by them. Agreements were signed, but these 
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merely endorsed the pre-determinations of the leading states. The great powers made the law, and 
smaller powers ratified the treaties.95 
The Concert system provided an international "learning experience" that foreshadowed many of the 
legislative and institution-making procedures of the twentieth-century. 96  All conferences held on 
matters of war, peace and security since the end of the Concert system have borne the mark of great 
power preponderance. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 - though based on a complete 
equality of representation (one State - one vote) and the rule of unanimity on all material decisions - 
exhibited an overwhelming inequality of influence among the participants. The Conferences were 
convened at the initiative of Russia. The proceedings - including the agenda and procedure - were 
determined by dominant military powers. Treaty provisions were largely based on the US Lieber 
Code or framed by delegates of the great powers. And on several occasions proposals supported by 
large majorities were abandoned simply because of the opposition of a few of the great powers.97 
While the principle of equality was formally preserved at The Hague, great powers were able to force 
their views upon the Conference or by their concerted opposition to prevent the adoption of 
unacceptable proposals. Claims of strict equality put forward by some smaller states - most famously 
by Barbosa of Brazil - were derided as "theoretical", "foolish" or "exuberant" by great power 
delegates, who insisted that the "useful role" of smaller nations should remain "spontaneous and 
disinterested" and be limited to raising awareness to "just causes" or "bringing harmony into the 
conflicting views of the Great Powers."98 
There was little equality at the Paris Peace Conference too. Negotiations concerning the peace treaty 
with Germany and the League of Nations Covenant were confined to the "Council of Five" 
(sometimes expanded to a "Council of Ten") and were conducted in utmost secrecy, despite President 
Wilson's Fourteen Points and his declared commitment to "open diplomacy".99 Decisions were made 
by the Allied powers behind closed doors, in gatherings where no secretaries were admitted and no 
official minutes were recorded. It was then left to smaller countries to ratify them. "Conferential 
tsarism" was pervasive during the negotiations. As one observer reported, when a Canadian delegate 
spoke of the "proposals" of the great powers, he was immediately corrected by Clemenceau, who 
intimated that these were not proposals but decisions, which were definitive and final.100 The same 
logic presided over the drafting of the UN Charter. Great powers were not prepared for the Charter to 
be drafted by a conference of large and small states. A full-scale conference, it was feared, would lead 
to innumerable difficulties and inefficiencies, causing great delay in the setting up of the new postwar 
security organization. It was therefore decided that the most effective way to prepare the Charter was 
for the great powers to reach an agreement first among themselves, and then to subject it to smaller 
countries for (marginal) amendments and adoption at a plenary meeting. Although equality of 
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representation and voting was maintained in San Francisco, the process was openly elitist and the 
main purpose of the Conference was no other than to get the smaller nations to approve a plan already 
worked out by the great powers (United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and later China) at the 
Dumbarton Oaks conference.101 
Treaty-making has, since Paris and San Francisco, become more accepting of genuine participation by 
smaller nations and more intolerant of brute assertions of power. The dominant status of great powers 
remains a pervasive feature of the legislative process however. Great powers retain overwhelming 
influence in setting the terms of reference for international negotiations. In the field of investment 
law, to give but one salient example, it has become habitual for leading capital exporting countries 
(mostly Western countries) to draft "model investment treaties" which provide the blueprint for 
agreements concluded with capital exporting countries (mostly developing countries), in conditions 
that are often less like negotiations among equals than an imposition of asymmetrical "contracts of 
adhesion", reminiscent of the capitulation agreements once imposed by colonial rulers against the 
periphery.102 In multilateral negotiations, conferential tsarism remains an enduring, if controversial, 
feature of treaty-making. Recent climate talks have for instance demonstrated a return, in the name of 
efficiency, to 19th century legislative practices. During the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit, a small 
group of great and emerging powers - citing political expedience and time constraints - brokered a 
deal in secret in the dying hours of the conference (the so-called "leaders' agreement") and presented 
it as a fait accompli to the rest of the delegates, with President Obama publicly announcing the 
outlines of the accord at a press conference before the end of the proceedings, leaving little choice to 
other nations but so sign up to the take-it-or-leave-it agreement.103 
Great powers, to finish, are able to marshal "soft power" to influence treaty-making.104 As well as the 
ability to apply economic and political pressures on other states, great powers possess ideational, 
cultural and human resources which they can mobilize to secure favorable outcomes in ways which 
are often not available to smaller nations. Leading states can draw upon large pools of experts, skilled 
negotiators and communicators to disseminate their ideas and make their claims seem legitimate in 
the eyes of others. Their bureaucracies possess the breadth and depth of regulatory knowledge 
necessary to effectively control and influence law-making in the functionally specialized institutions 
which now determine policies in areas such as market regulation, development, environment, 
transportation, public health, education and so on. Smaller states, by contrast, often experience 
difficulties in staffing their missions to the organizations and international gatherings where treaties 
and agreements are negotiated. They lack the soft co-optive and institutional power needed to 
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persuade other actors to define their interests in ways consistent with their own. Diplomacy, for those 
reasons, is therefore skewed in favor of the more affluent and powerful countries.105 
The power of individual states, to be sure, can sometimes be balanced by the "power of numbers". On 
some occasions, smaller nations have been successful in negotiating favorable provisions by 
mobilizing the power of the majority, a power which the UN has to an extent entrenched in 
institutions such as the General Assembly. Developing countries have, for instance, secured 
recognition for principles such as the right to self-determination, permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources or the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. These are, however, rare, 
moderate and often precarious successes.106 More often than not, great powers are able to block 
proposals supported by overwhelming majorities. This is especially true given the fragmentation of 
the legislative process in increasingly narrow functionalist regimes, a phenomenon that limits the 
opportunities for weaker actors to build cross-issue coalitions and increase their bargaining power.107 
In the WTO context, to provide a recent example, a cycle of negotiations known as the "Doha Round" 
was initiated in 2001 to tackle some of the fundamental inequities of the world trading system, in light 
of the needs and interests of developing countries. Small and emerging powers, however, have been 
unable to gain enough leverage to overcome the unwillingness of a few leading economies (EU, US 
and Japan in particular) to make concessions on issues such as farm subsidies and tariffs, despite a 
united front on at least some of the policy proposals. The Doha Agenda was eventually abandoned in 
December 2015, having failed to achieve any meaningful reform of the trading system.108 
If treaty-making is the work of power, so too is the formation of customary international law (CIL).109 
With regards to state practice - the primary element of CIL - powerful states possess the ability to 
engage in practice across a far wider range of issues than smaller nations, and their actions 
traditionally carry much greater weight in the formation of custom. As observed once by De Visscher, 
if the formation of CIL is akin to the gradual formation of a road across vacant land, then "among the 
users are always some who mark the soil more deeply with their footprints than others, either because 
of their weight, which is to say their power in the world, or because their interests bring them more 
frequently this way."110 Historically, the conduct of powerful states has been treated as more decisive 
- i.e. as more authoritative as a source of law - than that of less powerful ones. In many areas (e.g. 
maritime law, space law, law of immunities), CIL has in fact developed under the influence of 
remarkably few states. 111  Though it is generally said that state practice must nowadays be 
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"widespread" and "representative"112, it remains the case that the practice of the most dominant states 
possesses a particular force in the formation of CIL and that, conversely, a practice that is not 
supported by the world's major powers will not normally give rise to general customary rules.113 Great 
powers, to finish, exert special influence on the formation of CIL in more indirect ways, whether it be 
by influencing or controlling how other states behave (i.e. their practice), or through the historical role 
of Western lawyers in formulating CIL and their influence within bodies such as the ICJ or the ILC, 
which play a leading part in the identification and codification of customary law.114 
Power hierarchies among sovereign states have always been superimposed with other, no less 
significant hierarchies. Chief among those are gender hierarchies. International diplomacy and law-
making take place in traditionally and predominantly male spaces. International law is designed by 
and for states, the overwhelming majority of which are governed by men. At the time of writing, there 
were a mere 18 female heads of state and/or government (excluding figurehead monarchs) and only 
17% of government ministers worldwide were women.115 Gendered states, unsurprisingly, set up 
gendered institutions. Major international organizations such as the UN are highly patriarchal 
organizations, with limited or marginalized women presence.116 Since 1945, UN Secretaries-General 
have all been men. As of 1 January 2016, all but one members of the Security Council were men and 
only 23 percent of all Senior UN Officials were women, with a majority working in "soft" corners, i.e. 
on subjects traditionally associated with "feminine" concerns (sexual violence, children's rights, 
refugees, education) or in positions of relatively low prestige (e.g. conference management, budget 
and accounts), compared with the "hard" portfolios (political affairs, economic development, or 
peacekeeping), all traditionally trusted by men.117 
The invisibility of women becomes even more acute when looking at UN bodies with special 
functions regarding the progressive development and implementation of international law. Only four 
women have ever served on the International Law Commission and of the 58 Special Rapporteurs 
appointed since 1949, all but two were men.118 As for the International Court of Justice, only 4 
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women have ever sat on the bench out of the 106 judges elected since 1946, the first (Rosalyn 
Higgins) being appointed in 1995, fifty years after the Court's establishment.119 
The exclusion of women from law-making processes has important normative consequences. It 
undermines international law's democratic legitimacy, to start with, as women are prevented from 
participating in decisions that affect their lives. 120  But it does also bear on normative outputs. 
Women's issues or interests tend to be marginalized or consigned to separate spheres that are easily 
ignored, are typically articulated in soft language, and have weak compliance mechanisms. 121 
Gendered institutions produce decisions, norms and regimes that are largely constructed and defined 
by male experiences. The human rights regime, to give but the most obvious example, does not for 
instance deal in categories that fit the experiences of women. It has for instance historically reified 
civil and political rights at the expense of social, economic and cultural rights, with adverse 
consequences for women who suffer disproportionately from structural socio-economic 
inequalities. 122  Individual rights, likewise, have typically been conceptualized and applied in a 
gendered manner. Whilst for instance women's rights are most often violated within the family, the 
right to family life has traditionally been interpreted as a duty of "non-interference" in the private 
family sphere, preventing the application and development of human rights standards in relationships 
between men and women. 123  The gendered nature of law-making, to finish, means that when 
engagement with women's issues does occur (for instance Security Council resolutions on sexual 
violence during armed conflicts), international law tends to reinforce masculinist assumptions and 
institutional preferences which are harmful to women (for instance the stereotypical representation of 
women as "victims", the UN's commitment to globalization and militarism, and the hegemonic 
position of the Security Council).124 
 
C. Legalized Hierarchies 
 
The structure of international law-making, as the above makes clear, is one dominated by oligarchy 
and patriarchy. There is, it turns out, a significant discrepancy between the pragmatics of sources and 
the foundational principle of legislative equality. When confronted with this problem, international 
lawyers have traditionally deployed a variety of strategies to reconcile material hierarchies of 
influence and international law's formal commitment to sovereign equality. A classical posture of 
international lawyers in this regard is one that politely acknowledges the existence of legislative 
hierarchies but confines them to the political domain, outside the law, as a mere fact of international 
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life ("of course hierarchies exist. But these are political, not legal hierarchies"). This narrative is 
deceiving. It creates a false dichotomy between de facto and de jure hierarchies which neglects the 
manner in which hierarchies of influence are in reality internalized by the international legal order, 
including by its system of sources. 
International law (by which I mean actual, positive law, and not just diplomatic practice), to start 
with, has historically been very accepting of deviations from the principle of legislative equality. 
Nowhere is this more visible perhaps than in the law of treaties and its liberal attitude towards 
coercion. As noted above, international law has traditionally regarded treaties procured by the threat 
or use of force as fully valid, save for situations involving coercion of the individual representatives of 
the state. From Grotius to Oppenheim, the dominant view has classically been that treaties concluded 
as a result of force, whilst morally questionable, are just as binding as those made willingly, if only 
because states ought to be able to end wars by way of treaties in the knowledge that these treaties will 
not subsequently be invalidated on grounds of duress. 125 As international law's position towards 
armed force as a legitimate means of international relations began to change, so too did its position 
towards imposed treaties. In the inter-war period, demands began to emerge challenging the 
traditional view and claiming that treaties imposed by states using illegal force ought not to be 
recognized as legally binding.126 With the gradual development of the principle prohibiting the threat 
or use of force and the adoption of the UN Charter, the foundations of the traditional doctrine began to 
erode and a new rule of customary law against imposed treaties progressively crystallized in the post-
1945 period. That rule was eventually codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which provides that "a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use 
of force."127 
Critically, though, the new rule of international law providing for the invalidity of imposed treaties is 
only concerned with the most egregious forms of coercion involving the use or threat of military 
violence. During the negotiations of the Vienna Convention, an amendment was submitted by Afro-
Asian, Latin American and Communist states proposing that economic and political pressures be 
mentioned explicitly as falling within the concept of coercion, noting that the strangulation of a 
country's economy had become a weapon of choice of Western powers and could be equally as 
coercive as the threat or use of armed force.128 The amendment was however vigorously opposed, and 
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ultimately defeated, by the vast majority of Western states, who argued that the standard of economic 
pressure lacked objective content and that accepting economic duress as a ground of invalidity would 
prejudice the stability of treaty relations.129 That view was also supported by the ILC Rapporteurs, 
most notably by Waldock, who firmly resisted the demands of postcolonial states on the ground that 
extending the meaning of coercion to other forms of pressure would leave the door to the evasion of 
treaty obligations wide open.130 As a compromise between the two groups of states, a Declaration was 
attached to the Vienna Convention solemnly condemning the threat or use of pressure "in any form, 
whether military, political, or economic" in the conclusion of treaties. The Declaration, however, is 
drafted in broad political-declaratory language and does not form part of the Vienna Convention (the 
Convention does not refer to it). It lacks legal force and, as a result, the position today remains that 
coercion of states by way of economic or political constraint, though undesirable and prejudicial to 
good relations among states, is not under international law considered as vitiating consent.131  
As the above makes clear, international law as a legal system takes a relaxed, laissez-faire approach to 
freedom of consent and is largely accommodating of the various "methods of persuasion" used by 
dominant powers in treaty-making.132 International law doesn't simply tolerate legislative hierarchies, 
however. In many respects, it serves to consolidate and entrench these hierarchies by giving them a 
legal form. The great power prerogatives of the Concert System were not, for instance, a mere matter 
of political domination. As noted by Simpson, the Concert order was a highly legalized structure of 
governance: the Congress was established through a series of treaties; the Protocols by which the 
great powers proposed to dominate the Congress were legal instruments; the decisions of the 
Congress were set out in treaty form and subsequently ratified by European states. The great powers 
did not, then, just impose their will on other states through raw power. They established a new, highly 
hierarchical regime in which their dominant position was legally organized and sanctioned, and their 
hegemony endowed with institutional respectability (i.e. legitimacy). A hierarchy of might was thus 
converted into a hierarchy of right.133  
In this, the Concert system was a forerunner of the international organizations of the 20th century, in 
particular the United Nations. In San Francisco - as in Vienna - dominant powers were successful in 
carving special constitutional privileges for themselves, most notably through permanent 
representation in the Security Council and the veto power, giving them complete immunity from the 
enforcement jurisdiction of the Council and overall control over its decision-making. To be sure, the 
legalized hierarchy of the UN never reached the same scale as that of the Concert system. Great 
powers, when drafting the Charter, had to account for some of the demands emanating from small and 
medium powers to secure their participation. As a result, the privileged position of the P5 within the 
Council was mediated by elements of sovereign equality, most notably the establishment of the 
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General Assembly as an egalitarian chamber with perfect equality of representation and vote for all 
states.134 The P5, however, owing to their status on the Council, enjoy unparalleled bargaining power 
in the UN and possess overwhelming influence over the organization, its membership, and its 
legislative agenda, as well as controlling appointment of key personnel, including on law-making and 
law-ascertaining bodies such as the International Court of Justice.135 International organizations like 
the UN (or the Bretton Woods institutions in which voting rights are commensurate to economic 
power) therefore operate to institutionalize political dominance by giving it a formal, juridical status. 
This in large part explains why great powers have historically been supportive - if strategically and 
selectively - of institution-building.136 
Legislative hierarchies are, to finish, legalized through a variety of legal doctrines such as the doctrine 
of "specially affected states". According to this doctrine, which has a long history in international law, 
the practice of some states - because they are "most concerned" with a subject or have a greater "depth 
of experience" - weighs more heavily in the formation of customary law than that of others.137 This 
principle has been interpreted in practice as having two possible implications. Firstly, if all major 
interests are represented, there is no need for a majority of states to have participated in order for 
custom to emerge. Participation from a narrow but politically powerful circle of states may suffice. 
Secondly, and conversely, if specially affected states do not accept a particular practice, the said 
practice cannot mature into a rule of customary international law, even when it is otherwise 
broadly. 138  The question of who constitutes a "specially affected state" may vary according to 
circumstances. In some instances, that determination may rest on objective factors such as geography 
or location. Coastal states have for instance been considered more "specially affected" by the legal 
status of the continental shelf than landlocked states. 139  Likewise, small island States may be 
considered "specially affected" by climate change. In practice, however, the doctrine has generally 
been used as a disguise for important or powerful states, which are somehow assumed to be always 
"specially affected" by legal developments, given the "scope of their interests", the "extent of their 
resources", and the "reach of their practice."140  
The doctrine of specially affected states therefore gives great powers considerable influence over the 
formation of customary international law, most notably the ability to block the emergence of 
customary norms, even when these are otherwise supported by large majorities. The US was for 
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instance successful in arguing before the ICJ that, as a specially affected state, its opposition (with 
that of a few other nuclear powers) effectively blocked the development of a customary norm 
prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons.141 Likewise, the tribunal in the Texaco arbitration 
found that Resolution 3281 of the UN General Assembly ("Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States") could not be said to give rise to new principles of customary international law, despite the 
adoption of the Charter by an overwhelming majority of states (118 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions), 
because of the opposition of "developed countries with market economies which carry on the largest 
part of international trade". 142  The doctrine of "specially affected states", as these examples 
demonstrate, regularizes and legalizes great power dominance. It converts political power into rightful 
authority by formally recognizing that the practice and opinion of dominant states carries greater legal 
significance in law-making than that of small and medium powers. 
GENERAL CONCLUSION: OF NOBLE LIES, OPPORTUNE FALSEHOODS AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
OBSTACLES 
 
The "no-hierarchy" thesis, this paper argues, is descriptively and normatively problematic. 
Descriptively, it does not accurately reflect the highly differentiated nature of the doctrine of sources 
and the pervasive inequalities that characterize law-making in the international community. The thesis 
is, from this point of view, analytically inconsistent with the "real world" of sources, a world that is 
replete with (more or less formalized) hierarchies of worth, status and influence. As such, the thesis 
amounts to what French philosopher Gaston Bachelard used to call an "epistemological obstacle", i.e. 
a commonly accepted conception or idea that does not add value to our existing knowledge and, 
worse, that obstructs and impedes scientific progress.143 Normatively, the thesis is problematic too, in 
that it serves to conceal or marginalize these hierarchies, rendering them immune to critical scrutiny 
and challenge. As noted by Charlesworth, narrow discussions of (the lack of) formal hierarchies 
among international law sources "allow international lawyers to sidestep complex debates about the 
function of international law and the relative legitimacies of state consent and claims of justice."144 
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Engaging in debates about sources and sources hierarchies along restricted, formalistic lines serves to 
"postpon[e] (possibly indefinitely) discussion of the politics of the designated sources" and "obscures 
the fact that international law is generated by a multi-layered process of interactions, instruments, 
pressures and principles."145 
Relegating what Charlesworth calls the "politics of sources" to the periphery of the legal domain is 
not satisfactory. As argued above, law-making hierarchies do not operate outside the law, as a mere 
matter of geopolitical economy, lying within the exclusive jurisdiction of political scientists. These 
hierarchies are to a great extent sanctioned, organized and formalized through international legal 
institutions and law-making processes. Though they are often counterpoised by elements of equality 
and equivalence, legislative hierarchies are thus an integral part of the international legal order, and of 
its system of sources. In these circumstances, as Anand suggests, the mere recitation of the pious and 
holy principle of sovereign equality "hardly makes a difference .... : even after you give the squirrel a 
certificate which says he is quite as big as any elephant, he is still going to be smaller, and all the 
squirrels will know it and all the elephants will know it."146 Recanting mechanically the no-hierarchy 
thesis among and in the sources of international law merely serves to legitimize and reproduce real-
world legislative inequalities by neutralizing them. When this happens, the "noble lie" of equality and 
horizontality turns into an "opportune falsehood", an ideational device that justifies gross inequalities 
of political power and juridical authority.147 This may not be a problem for system apologists or 
proponents of the status quo. It is, however, for anyone committed to systemic change and 
redistribution, and the no-hierarchy thesis must therefore be rejected as an accepted axiom of 
international law. For the first step in redressing inequalities is to recognize when and where they 
occur and challenge vocabularies that defuse and naturalize them. 
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